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Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence on the behaviour of interbank lending in
Germany after a monetary policy impulse. Our VAR analysis shows that following
a monetary contraction, the banking system as a whole attracts additional funds
from foreign banks. Whereas small cooperative and savings banks do not seem to
directly access the interbank market themselves, they do so indirectly through the
head institutions of their sectors, i.e. the savings banks‘ and credit cooperative
sector, respectively. The interbank flows within these two sectors allow small
banks to access funds that might help them in keeping their loan portfolio rela-
tively unaffected. This may explain why the evidence for a bank lending channel in
Germany seems to be weaker compared to other countries, e.g. the US.
JEL classification: C32, E52, G21
keywords: monetary policy, bank lending channel, interbank marketECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 5
Non-technical summary
A distinctive feature of the German banking system is its sectoral
organisation: the vast majority of small banks is affiliated to either the savings
banks’ or the credit cooperative sector, with large banks serving as head
institutions. This organisational structure has consequences for the reaction of
banks to monetary policy.
We show that banks react to monetary contractions by redistributing liquidity
on the interbank market. The most important movements we identify take
place within the savings banks’ and the credit cooperative sector, where small
and medium-sized banks experience a net inflow of funds from large banks.
Large banks, on the other hand, attract liquidity from abroad.
Regarding loans to non-banks, we find that small banks within the two sectors
manage to maintain their loan portfolio after a monetary contraction, whereas
loans of large banks fall. This suggests that small banks use the redistribution
of liquidity in the interbank market to cushion the effects of restrictive monetary
policy on their loans to non-banks. This result is compatible with the hypothesis
that especially small banks maintain housebank relationships to their customers.
This result has implications for a test on the role of banks in monetary policy
transmission. Several recent publications have dealt with this topic for the US
economy. The hypothesis that banks reduce their loan supply after a
monetary tightening has been tested by looking at the response of loans of
different banks. Banks have often been classified in terms of their size,
assuming that a small bank will have more difficulties to maintain its lending
behaviour than a large bank does. The underlying idea of these tests is that
banks have to refinance their loans, and that small banks face a disadvantage
with respect to large banks in the markets for these funds.
Given the supportive evidence for the US, this testing strategy has also been
applied to Germany and various other countries. This paper argues that such
an empirical analysis needs to take into account the characteristics of the
national banking structure. The role of size as a determinant of the reaction of
a bank’s loan supply to monetary policy need not be useful in a case like
Germany, since the vast majority of small banks can overcome their
disadvantage in accessing funds through their affiliation to a sector with large
banks as head institutions.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 6
1 Introduction
Of the various channels transmitting monetary policy,
1 the “credit channel” re-
ceived major attention in recent research. It is built on the primary insight that finan-
cial markets are characterised by an asymmetric distribution of information among
the market participants. If in such an environment monetary policy is able to alter the
supply of external finance, its effects are unevenly distributed across economic
agents: The more severe the informational asymmetry, the more difficult it should be
for firms and households to switch between external and internal finance and the
more strongly should their spending behaviour be affected.
Within this credit channel theory, the “bank lending channel” concentrates on a
specific type of external finance, namely on bank loans. Given that banks are a device
to deal with the informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers,
2 bank
loans are not perfectly substitutable by other forms of external finance, at least for
some borrowers. If therefore banks react to restrictive monetary policy impulses by
reducing their loan supply, especially those firms and households should be affected
that have to rely on bank loans. This is in contrast with the traditional interest rate
channel of monetary transmission, which derives effects of monetary policy through
interest rate effects on loan demand rather than on loan supply.
Both firm and bank data have frequently been used to test for the existence of a
bank lending channel.
3 To identify loan demand (which should decrease following a
monetary tightening according to the interest rate channel) from loan supply (which
is the transmitter in the bank lending channel), size was usually the discriminatory
device.
4 It has been argued that asymmetric information problems are more severe
for small firms and banks. As a consequence, they should experience higher financ-
                                                                
1 For an overview of the different transmission channels see e.g. Cecchetti, S. (1995) and Mishkin, F.S. (1996).
2 For an overview of different theories on financial intermediation see e.g. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) or
Kashyap et al. (1999).
3 For studies using firm data see e.g. Christiano et al. (1996), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) for the US; for the euro
area, Mojon (2000) provides an extensive overview of the available evidence; for Germany, see e.g. Ehrmann
(2000).
4 Some papers also concentrated on the degree of liquidity (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000)) and on
capitalisation (see e.g. Peek and Rosengren (1995)).ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 7
ing costs and/or a stronger decrease in the availability of funds after a monetary
tightening. For the case of banks, this means that small banks should show a larger
decline in their lending to non-banks. For the US, the evidence is fairly supportive for
this transmission channel.
5 Therefore, this size-related idea to identify loan supply
movements has been applied to other countries, too.
For Germany, only very few such studies were conducted with bank data up to
now, which is mainly due to the restricted data availability. Based on BankScope, a
dataset covering a sample of (among others) German banks, DeBondt (2000) finds
evidence for the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy to be dependent on
bank size in a panel econometric analysis. On the other hand, Favero et al. (1999) do
not find such evidence using the same database in a cross-sectional analysis. Ehr-
mann et al. (2001) – testing for a differential reaction of bank loans to monetary pol-
icy across banks for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the euro-area as a whole – do
not find evidence for a bank lending channel based on bank size as the discriminat-
ing variable. They also show that BankScope is not necessarily a useful database for
exercises of this kind. Worms (2001) – using the Bundesbank´s bank balance sheet
statistics covering all German banks – cannot reject the hypothesis that the reaction of
a bank´s lending to monetary policy depends on its size, although this effect does not
seem to be of macroeconomic importance.
In this paper, we will argue that a study of the bank lending channel in Germany
has to consider the peculiarities of the German banking system. Several features
might be considered in this respect. For example, the Bundesbank deals with a larger
share of banks as counterparties than the Federal Reserve.
6 This indicates that it is
much easier for small banks to access central bank money. Furthermore, the coop-
erative banks´ sector - to which the lion´s share of small banks belongs - as well as
the savings banks´ sector operate funds backed up by mutual guarantees, which
serve to recapitalise the respective member institutions or to satisfy the creditors in
the case of insolvency. Therefore, even if size were a good proxy for informational
asymmetries, those informational problems could well be without immediate conse-
                                                                
5 See, e.g., Kashyap et al. (1993), Kashyap and Stein (2000).
6 See Borio (1997), p. 49 and 71.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 8
quences for the lending behaviour of banks, rendering size an inadequate variable to
identify loan supply and thereby the bank lending channel.
Furthermore, it has often been argued that the German banking system, charac-
terised to a large extent by relationship lending, weakens the case for the bank lend-
ing channel. The German system of “Hausbanken”
7, along this line of reasoning, tends
to shelter borrowers from the short-term effects of a restrictive monetary policy. Al-
though this might be the case, it is unclear how German banks are able to perform
this task given that restrictive monetary policy leads to a drain of (or to a rise in the
price for) reserves. This is especially relevant in the case of the small, local banks be-
cause they usually are assumed to entertain these close “Hausbank” relationships to
their customers. Keeping up the lending relationships could prove to be difficult if
they are affected disproportionately strongly from the drain of funds following a
monetary contraction.
We will argue that the structure of the German banking system offers the potential
to counteract the distributional effects of the bank lending channel. The German in-
terbank market is structured in a way that enables most small banks to attract funds
through large banks. Using grouped monthly balance sheet data on all German
banks, we show that small banks can alleviate the disproportionate drain of funds on
the interbank market. This effect can explain why it has been difficult to detect bank
lending channel effects in Germany using bank size as the sole device for identifica-
tion.
8
In the remainder of the paper, we will first introduce the dataset underlying our
analysis and provide a description of the German interbank market, highlighting the
characteristics that give rise to our presumption. Section 3 then describes how we
organise the data for the empirical analysis. The subsequent section 4 analyses the
reaction of bank loans to non-banks to a restrictive monetary policy shock, where we
use the traditional bank size criterion as the discriminatory device. In a very simple
                                                                
7 See, e.g., Elsas and Krahnen (1998).
8 Pill (1997) argues similarly that in a small open economy size in itself might not be a good proxy for tests of the
bank lending channel. He finds that monetary policy tightenings in Spain are tempered by the ability of banks to
borrow abroad. Also, Angeloni et al. (1995) show that the institutional features of national banking systems needECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 9
setting that does not use bank-size related control variables for loan demand, we find
that small banks do not seem to decrease their lending by more than large banks do.
Instead, rather the opposite seems to be the case. Therefore, in section 5 we go on to
investigate the interbank flows that follow a restrictive monetary policy impulse,
testing our presumption that small banks can indirectly access additional interbank
funds. We find that the bulk of small banks, namely those that are part of the savings
banks‘ or the credit cooperative sector, is supplied with funds from the head institu-
tions of their respective sector. By removing all banks that are organised in such a
sector from our database and subsequently re-running the simple estimations from
section 4, we are able to show in section 6 that for the remaining banks size matters
for the reaction of their loans to non-banks to monetary policy shocks, as predicted
by the bank lending channel theory. Section 7 concludes.
2 The database and the structure of the German interbank market
The data used in this analysis was taken from the balance sheet statistics of the
Deutsche Bundesbank. It comprises individual bank balance sheet data of all German
banks for the period 1992-1998 on a monthly basis. The period after 1998 was not
used in this study because harmonisation procedures in the uprun to EMU led to a
break in the data definitions. The data on interbank assets and liabilities is disaggre-
gated into several maturity categories and contains information on the respective
counterparties.
Table 1 contains information on the interbank linkages of the various bank groups.
The savings banks hold almost three quarters of their interbank assets vis-à-vis their
head institutions (in the case of the credit cooperatives this share stands even higher,
at 92%). It can also be seen that the savings banks and the credit cooperatives hold
only a relatively small share of their interbank assets vis-à-vis banks that are not part
of their respective sector (foreign banks and “other” domestic banks). Contrary to
this, the head institutions of the two sectors hold about 54% (savings banks´ sector)
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
to be taken into account for studies of the bank lending channel. They show that, in Italy, large banks increase the
interest rates on loans by more than small banks do, a feature related to the existence of customer relationships.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 10
and about 42% (cooperative sector) vis-à-vis “other” domestic banks. The largest
share of interbank assets vis-à-vis foreign banks is held by the “other” domestic
banks, highlighting their close relationships with banks abroad.
Table 1: Structure of interbank assets and liabilities by bank category
a
% of total interbank assets or liabilities, respectively
interbank assets/interbank liabilities vis-à-vis















...assets 72.0 n.a. 26.6 1.5 0.0 savings
banks ...liabilities 55.6 n.a. 34.1 0.2 10.1





c ...liabilities n.a. 13.1 61.0 15.8 10.1
...assets 92.3 n.a. 7.3 0.4 0.0 coopera-
tive banks ...liabilities 80.6 n.a. 15.8 1.9 1.8






tutions ...liabilities n.a. 54.8 33.9 4.5 6.9
...assets 0.0 0.0 69.9 30.1 0.0
“other” banks ...liabilities 0.0 0.0 64.8 29.2 6.0
a average of the bank-individual ratios over all banks in a category and over all available months.
b including mortgage banks.
c including DGZ Dekabank Deutsche Kommunalbank.
This picture does not change considerably when interbank liabilities are consid-
ered. Table 1 therefore leads to the notion, that the “other” domestic banks have close
linkages with foreign banks, whereas the head institutions of the two bank sectors
have close relationships with the lower level institutions of their respective system
and with the “other” domestic banks. While the head institutions of the savings
banks´ sector do have considerable relationships with foreign banks, the linkages
between the cooperative central banks and foreign banks seem to be much weaker.
Savings banks and cooperative banks have close relationships almost exclusively
with the head institutions of their respective sector.
This leads us to the stylised description of the German interbank market depicted
in figure 1:
9 We identify two segments of the German interbank market, the external
(see upper part of figure 1) and the internal interbank market (see lower part). The
                                                                
9 See Upper and Worms (2001) for a more detailed description based on an estimated matrix of bilateral exposures
in the German interbank market.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 11
internal interbank market denotes the linkages within the two bank sectors, the co-
operative sector and the savings banks´ sector. The cooperative banks as well as the
savings banks maintain their main lending relationships with their respective head
institutions. Almost no lending takes place between the single member banks within
the two sectors. It is the head institutions (the Landesbanken for the savings banks and
the cooperative central banks for the credit cooperatives) which establish the link to the
external domestic interbank market for their whole sector. This external interbank
market, in turn, is characterised by multiple lending relationships between all par-
ticipating banks. It is only the external interbank market that has a non-negligible
connection with foreign banks (as will be shown in table 2).
Figure 1: Stylised description of the German interbank market
The fact that most small and medium-sized banks are organised within one of the
two bank sectors with internal interbank markets (see below) casts doubt on the pre-
sumption that large and small banks face a different reaction of their access to fund-
ing in case of restrictive monetary policy actions. It can at least not be ruled out a pri-
ori that in case of a restrictive monetary policy measure the head institutions of the
two bank sectors channel funds to their affiliated small institutions, thus counteract-
ing potential funding problems otherwise faced by these small institutions. In this
case, the situation of a small bank following a monetary contraction does not neces-
sarily depend on its size, but rather on its head institutions’ availability of funds and
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3 Definition of bank size classes and construction of grouped data
In order to test the hypothesis that the reaction of a bank´s interbank borrowing
and lending to monetary policy depends on its size, the banks are classified into
three size classes. Banks are denoted “small” if at a given point in time their sum of
total assets is less than the 75-percentile of the distribution of total assets over all
banks. A bank is denoted “large” if its total assets are equal to or larger than the 95-
percentile. All other banks have “medium size” by definition. Table 2 entails infor-
mation on the relative importance of these three size groups for June 1995, the mid-
dle of our sample period, but the following qualitative remarks on the structure of
the German banking system hold for all other periods as well.
3.1 Descriptive evidence on the size structure of the German banking system
The group of small banks contains only credit cooperatives (88%), savings banks
and “other” banks. The four cooperative central banks and 13 head institutions of the
savings banks´ sector all belong to the group of large banks. In this group, only 0.4%
of the cooperative banks could be found. The lion share of all savings banks can be
found in the group of medium-sized banks.
Table 2 shows furthermore that there is a glaring heterogeneity with respect to the
size of the banks in terms of their share in total assets: While the small banks – by
definition 75% of all banks – hold only about 8% of total assets, the 5% largest banks
hold almost three quarters of total assets. This heterogeneity – although not that ex-
treme – exists also in terms of the share in total loans to non-banks: 2420 small credit
cooperatives hold about 8% of these loans, whereas 89 large “other” banks hold more
than 45%.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 13




















small 2748 8.4 9.2 5.2 5.4 1.5 2.1
of which: savings banks 139 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0
Landesbanken 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
credit cooperatives 2420 6.8 7.7 4.2 3.9 0.0 0.2
coop. central banks 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
other banks 189 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.8
medium 733 17.5 18.9 9.1 15.6 7.5 9.8
of which: savings banks 420 10.8 12.1 4.0 9.1 0.1 0.1
Landesbanken 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
credit cooperatives 200 3.9 4.4 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.2
coop. central banks 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
other banks 113 2.8 2.4 2.5 4.6 7.3 9.6
large 184 74.1 71.9 85.6 79.0 91.0 88.1
of which: savings banks 68 8.4 9.8 3.4 6.8 0.6 0.2
Landesbanken 13 17.7 14.1 28.0 25.2 24.7 20.8
credit cooperatives 10 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.0
coop. central banks 4 3.1 1.0 8.3 10.7 3.2 1.8
other banks 89 43.9 45.9 44.6 35.7 62.1 65.2
all banks 3665 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which: savings banks 627 20.1 22.9 7.7 16.6 0.7 0.3
Landesbanken 13 17.7 14.1 28.0 25.2 24.7 20.8
credit cooperatives 2630 11.7 13.2 8.1 6.4 0.4 0.4
coop. central banks 4 3.1 1.1 8.3 10.7 3.2 1.8
other banks 391 47.4 48.8 47.8 41.1 70.9 76.6
The 17 head institutions of the two bank sectors hold about one third of all (gross)
domestic interbank assets and liabilities, the “other” banks almost half of the inter-
bank assets and about 40% of the interbank liabilities. Due to the fact that these banks
belong to the group of large banks, this group holds 86% of all domestic interbank
assets and 79% of all domestic interbank liabilities. This indicates, that the head in-
stitutions of the two sectors play an outstanding role in the German interbank mar-
ket.
Table 2 also shows that about 90% of (gross) foreign interbank liabilities and assets
are held by the group of large banks. The share of foreign interbank assets and li-
abilities held by savings banks and the cooperative sector as a whole is negligible, so
that about 95% are held solely by the Landesbanken and the group of “other” banks.
This confirms the description in the last section: It is mainly the group of large banks
(and there almost exclusively the Landesbanken and the ”other” banks) that have
lending and borrowing relationships to foreign banks.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 14
3.2 Construction of grouped time series
The grouped time series are constructed as follows: In a first step, for every single
period t, every bank is categorised as being small, medium or large. In a second step,
the individual asset and liability positions are added up groupwise for every period
(methodology (1)). This allows banks to change the size group from period to pe-
riod.
10 Therefore, changes in the aggregated asset and liability positions of the groups
can in principle be caused by two factors: Changes in the composition of the groups
or changes in the underlying bank individual asset and liability positions. In order to
generate series that are not affected by compositional changes, an additional meth-
odology is applied (methodology (2)). For every period t, we assign each bank to one
of the three size groups, both for the current and the previous period t-1 separately.
All banks that are not in the same group for both these periods t and t-1 are not taken
into account (for the calculation referring to period t only). This creates size groups
that contain the same banks in t and in t-1. Then, the individual asset and liability
positions of the remaining banks are added up groupwise, for t and t-1. Subse-
quently, period-to-period growth rates of the respective positions are calculated on
the basis of this groupwise aggregated data, leading to a time series of consistent
growth rates. In the last step, these growth rates are used to construct a time series of
volumes by multiplying the (cumulated) growth rates with the respective starting
value in January 1992.
Methodology (2) creates time series of grouped asset and liability volumes that
change only due to movements in the underlying individual balance sheet positions.
Since both methodologies have their specific drawbacks – (1) is sensitive to composi-
tional changes, (2) does not necessarily contain the “true” value of the balance sheet
positions of the group at hand – we perform the econometric analysis for both types
of grouped data. Furthermore, the data generated by methodology (1) is used in lev-
                                                                
10 On average, about 19 banks move from one size group into another group in every month. This is mainly due to
changes in the threshold values caused by the reduction in the population and to a small extent by extraordinary
increases in the size of single banks caused by mergers. On average, about 12 group switches per month could be
explained by these two factors, leaving only about 7 changes that are due to a comparatively strong or weak
change in total assets. This corresponds to only 0.2% of the respective population of banks, which should be
negligible. We can therefore rule out the possibility that compositional changes of the groups are endogenous, i.e.
caused by monetary policy.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 15
els (measured in 1000 DM) and alternatively in ratios, i.e. as shares of total assets.
Here, we take account of the type of position we look at, when determining the de-
nominator: if the numerator is a net position, e.g. interbank assets net of a specific
interbank liability position, then the denominator is the comparable net position, e.g.
total asset net of this specific interbank liability position.
Figure A1 shows the time series of the net interbank positions calculated with
methodology (1). The upper panel represents the overall interbank position of small,
medium-sized and large banks. The series in the second panel report the positions of
banks on the “external” interbank market, i.e. those positions that are not held within
the savings banks and the cooperative sector. Those intra-sectoral balances are
shown in the third panel. Finally, the fourth panel contains the positions of German
banks abroad. A further disaggregation shows that the trending behaviour of many
of those series is mainly caused by long-term positions, whereas most of the variabil-
ity arises in the short maturities of up to three months.
4 Monetary policy and bank loans to non-banks
In order to analyse the effects of monetary policy on bank loans and later on the
interbank market, we employ Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR). In particu-
lar, we use the identification scheme proposed by King, Plosser, Stock and Watson
(1991), since this strategy allows us to explicitly take potential nonstationarities of
our time series into account. A detailed discussion of both SVAR models and the
identification procedure followed here is provided in the appendix.
Our initial model consists of a four-variate VAR with  ]’ [ t t t t t l y r X p = , where
t r  stands for a nominal interest rate,  t p  for inflation,  t y  for real output and  t l  for the
real volume of bank loans to non-banks. Since the interest rate serves as the indicator
for the stance of monetary policy, we use the three months money market rate. Infla-
tion and output are important factors in any central bank’s reaction function, so it is
crucial to include these variables in our system. For a measure of inflation, we opted
for producer price inflation rather than consumer prices, since for the sample period
under consideration, consumer prices are very much distorted by indirect tax in-ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 16
creases and one-off effects of German unification. The choice of industrial production
as the output variable arises naturally, because we want to keep the monthly fre-
quency of the bank balance sheet database.
11 VARs consisting of an interest rate, in-
flation and output became a sort of standard or basic framework for empirical
monetary policy analysis within the last years. In order to test our hypothesis, which
relates to the bank lending channel, we have to enhance this basic framework with a
loan variable.
12 We furthermore include seasonal dummies and a linear trend (which
is restricted to lie in the cointegrating space in order to avoid a quadratic trend in the
level of the variables). The lag length of our models is chosen such that autoregres-
sive error terms are avoided, which is accomplished by the inclusion of four lags. All
models are estimated as Vector Error Correction Models (VECM) in order to allow
for cointegration relations between the variables.
As a matter of fact, the cointegration analysis suggests the existence of three coin-
tegration relations (see table A1 in the appendix). A natural candidate for one of
these equilibrium relationships is some kind of central bank reaction function. We
expect that the Bundesbank, when setting interest rates, took into account inflation
and the output gap.
13 For the sample period under study, it happens to be that output
is not subject to a trend. Therefore, measuring the output gap as the deviation of in-
dustrial production from trend coincides with the original output variable. Another
equilibrium relationship often found in empirical studies is the stationarity of the real
interest rate. For the third cointegrating vector, we will test whether bank loans to
non-banks lt are cointegrating with interest rates.
                                                                
11 In Germany, industrial production approximates GDP fairly well, unlike, e.g., in the US.
12 The loan aggregate we use here is fairly broad. It includes loans to government and to private non-banks, and
covers mortgage loans as well as all other loan types. Repeating the analysis with a more homogeneous loan (but
smaller) aggregate, i.e. loans to private firms only, does not produce qualitatively different results. Due to the fact
that the broader aggregate is of higher macroeconomic importance, we decided to present the results based on
this loan variable.
13 This is compatible with assuming that the Bundesbank followed an intermediate monetary target when setting
interest rates. See e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (1999), esp. p. 53.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 17
The cointegrating vectors are therefore estimated as
t r t p t y t l t






























It can be seen that the coefficient on inflation in the monetary policy reaction
function is slightly larger than one, as would be adequate in a Taylor-rule frame-
work. The stationarity of real interest rates can be improved by adding a linear trend
for this sample period. Bank loans depend negatively on the level of interest rates,
which is compatible with both, the bank lending channel and the interest rate chan-
nel. The overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected by a 
2 c -test (see table A2 in
the appendix).
The sample period under inspection is characterised by a trending behaviour of
several variables, related to the uprun to EMU and the consequences of German
unification, which is reflected also in the real interest rates. This is due to the fact that
we have data available only for a short sample period.
14 Over a longer sample, real
interest rates have been found to be stationary without the inclusion of a trend.
15 Due
to the fact that including a trend into the real interest rate cointegration equation is
somewhat unappealing from a theoretical point of view, we carried out a sensitivity
analysis (see appendix A4). It shows that the inclusion of the linear trend improves
the tests on the overidentifying restrictions substantially, but does not affect the
qualitative results of the impulse response analysis.
To proceed with the impulse response analysis, it is necessary to identify the
monetary policy shock. The first identification restriction we impose is to assume
that the shock is transitory, because after some time all variables should return to
                                                                
14 The short sample also precludes tests for the stability of the empirical results.
15 See Ehrmann (2000).ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 18
baseline. Additionally, we impose the fairly standard assumption that it affects nei-
ther inflation nor output within the same month.
The impulse responses are depicted in the first four graphs of figure A2. All re-
sponses are presented with 90% error bounds. It can be seen that a contractionary
monetary policy shock leads to a temporary decrease in inflation and output, and
that it decreases bank lending significantly. These results are in line with conven-
tional theory. However, the impulse responses show a brief price puzzle
16 and a sur-
prising initial response of output. Since both of them disappear in the subsequent
estimates, we decided not to elaborate on the model at this stage. Both effects do not
affect our qualitative results that are based on extended versions of this baseline
model.
To see whether the size of banks affects the response of loans to a restrictive
monetary policy shock, we re-estimate this model for the group of small and large
banks separately.
17 The bank lending channel predicts that small banks’ loan supply
to non-banks should decline by more than that of large banks does. This differential
reaction is used as an identification device to separate loan supply from loan demand
reactions. Assuming that the loan demand responds in the same way for all banks,
regardless of their size, a different reaction in bank lending for banks of different size
identifies a reaction of loan supply. However, as can be seen in the last two graphs of
figure A2 (see appendix), this cannot be found in our experiment: Most of the overall
reduction in bank loans seems to be borne by large banks, with small banks showing
no significant response at all. This is compatible with the notion that small banks are
to some extent insulating their loan customers from monetary policy induced in-
creases in interest rates, which is in line with the relationship banking assumption
often met in the case of Germany. To use the size of banks to identify loan supply
from loan demand is therefore not suitable for the German case. This implies that the
third cointegrating vector can represent either a supply or a demand reaction.
Notwithstanding this identification issue, it remains to be seen how the small
banks manage to insulate their lending from monetary policy impulses, because after
                                                                
16 This is often found for post-unification Germany. See, e.g., Peersman and Smets (2000).
17 For the results of the cointegration analysis, see the second and third columns of tables A1 and A2.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 19
a restrictive monetary policy shock they should be in need for additional funds in
order to be able to do so. The underlying assumption of bank lending channel theo-
ries, namely that small banks find it more difficult than large banks to finance their
lending following an interest rate increase, does not seem to hold in the German case.
There must be a mechanism at work, which enables small banks to overcome these
financing problems often assumed to be relevant for other countries. Our hypothesis
is that the German interbank market provides some compensation mechanism: even
if small banks might see their deposits shrinking by more than large banks or might
find it more difficult to access other sources of finance, they will be able to access ad-
ditional funds on the interbank market. We will test this hypothesis in the subse-
quent section.
5 Monetary policy and interbank lending
5.1 The empirical models
In this section, the regression models are a slightly adjusted version of the ones in
the preceding section. The main macroeconomic variables - interest rates, inflation
and industrial production - are kept, whereas the bank loan variable is substituted
for by various interbank lending variables. The way we measure bank lending
changes somewhat, however: We are only interested in the net position of a bank on
the interbank market, since for our purposes it is not relevant whether a bank adjusts
its interbank position by adjusting its liabilities or its assets. Since the net position can
be either positive or negative, it is not possible to take logarithms of the data. This is
not a serious drawback in our case, as the net position should be fluctuating around a
balanced position, i.e. around zero, so it cannot be subject to an exponential path in
the long run.
18 The nominal values can increase over time, however.
The estimations are therefore performed in three ways. Firstly, the series of the
asset and liability volumes that were achieved with methodology (1) are used. Alter-
natively, those volumes are used to construct ratios, i.e., the levels are scaled by total
                                                                
18 Although it should be fluctuating around zero, the variables can deviate from zero for long periods of time.
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assets of the respective group, the latter corrected for interbank liabilities. In a third
variant, the series derived with methodology (2) are used to ensure that the results
are not driven by changes in the composition of the size classes. This sensitivity
analysis is necessary and useful because in the sample period studied, the German
banking industry underwent significant changes due to merger and acquisition ac-
tivities.
19 We can, however, safely conclude that all three ways of measuring inter-
bank lending yield qualitatively equivalent results.
In order to enhance comparability across models, the monetary policy shock
should be identical in all models. Preliminary estimations showed that this can be
achieved by keeping one interbank variable in each of the different variants of the
model. This provides an “anchor” that limits the deviations between the models to a
minimum and creates basically identical responses of interest rates, inflation and in-
dustrial production across all different models. The anchor that performs best in this
respect is the net interbank position of the group of largest banks in the internal in-
terbank market. In the following, the VARs hence consist of
]’ [ , 2 , 1 t t t t t t l l y r X p = , where  t l , 1  denotes this anchor variable, and  t l , 2  stands for
various alternative interbank variables that change from specification to specification
and that make it possible to test our hypothesis of a differential behaviour across size
groups.
20
The cointegration analysis proceeds along the same lines as above. For most of
the models, a cointegrating rank of four results (see table A3 in the appendix). In or-
der to harmonise the various regressions, this rank is maintained for all of the mod-
els. The cointegrating vectors regarding the Bundesbank reaction function and real
interest rates are restricted to be numerically identical to the ones estimated in the
preceding section in each of the models, again to enhance comparability of the re-
sults. The other relations are allowed to vary, but relate the interbank lending to in-
terest rates, allowing for a time trend. The overidentifying restrictions can never be
                                                                
19 For a description, see e.g. Worms (2001).
20 The anchor is highly collinear with the internal bank lending variables of the other size classes. Nonetheless, the
regressions yield practically identical results when estimating a model with both the anchor and another internal
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rejected, as is shown in table A4 (see appendix). The estimated cointegration relations
of the interbank variables are provided in table A5 (also in the appendix).
5.2 Segments of the interbank market
Figures A3 to A5 in the appendix show the impulse responses for the various
interbank lending models. The first row in each case depicts the responses of interest
rates, inflation and output to a monetary policy shock. Across all models these re-
sponses do not differ considerably. Also, the price puzzle has disappeared from all
specifications, and the surprising initial output response remains in only one of them.
This indicates that the VARs are generally well specified.
The second row looks at lending of banks in the overall interbank market, sepa-
rately for all three size classes. Since the variables are defined as net asset positions,
i.e. assets minus liabilities, a negative reaction signals an increase in the net borrow-
ing of a specific bank group. The impulse responses show that banks of all size cate-
gories increase their net borrowing following a monetary contraction. This might
seem puzzling at first sight, since the database comprises the full population of Ger-
man banks. However, the German interbank market is not a closed system, since
banks can (and do, as will be shown below) access also the international interbank
market. So it seems as if all bank groups had a chance to cushion the restrictive effect
of monetary policy by financing their loans following a monetary policy tightening
via the interbank market. In the following, we will therefore look at different seg-
ments of interbank lending.
The third row of figures A3 to A5 contains the responses of the lending positions
in the external interbank market, i.e. excluding intra-sectoral balances. The responses
of banks‘ positions are quite revealing. Small banks do not increase their borrowing
in this market segment, whereas medium-sized and large banks attract additional
finance through this channel. These impulse responses are in line with the bank
lending channel theory. If this were the only source of interbank credit, small banks
would face a deterioration of their financing situation, and as such would be forced
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The channel that distinguishes the German from the US banking system and that
counteracts these distributional effects of monetary policy is analysed in row 4 of
figures A3 to A5. Here, we look at positions on the internal interbank market. It turns
out that small banks raise additional funds following a monetary tightening in this
market segment. Actually, virtually all of their borrowing in the overall interbank
market is supplied through the intra-sectoral links, as can be seen by comparing the
magnitude of responses in rows 2 and 4. Similarly, medium-sized banks borrow on
the intra-sectoral segment, and get the bulk of their financing needs from this source.
On the other hand, the group of large banks, which includes all head institutions of
both the savings banks´ and credit cooperative sectors, turns out to be a net lender
after the monetary contraction.
The last market segment that can be distinguished is bank lending from abroad.
This aggregate consists of all interbank positions of German banks with banks
abroad, including foreign branches of German banks.
21 Here, again, the responses are
in line with the assumptions of bank lending theories – the results are compatible
with the notion that small banks suffer from informational disadvantages that pre-
vent them from increasing their exposure to the international interbank market. The
most important players in this market are the largest banks, which receive the main
parts of their additional borrowing from abroad. The results are therefore consistent
with the notion that after a restrictive monetary policy measure the group of large
banks borrows funds from abroad that are then channelled to the small and medium-
sized banks by the head institutions of the two bank sectors. This inflow of funds can
of course take different forms, either an increased borrowing or a withdrawal of de-
posits, either at foreign banks or at the foreign branches of the German banks.
                                                                
21 On average over the sample period 1992-1998, around 55% of these interbank positions were denominated in
DM. The remaining positions are converted into DM at the current exchange rate. This leads to some ambiguity in
the impulse responses: if an interest rate increase leads to an exchange rate appreciation, then this c.p. lowers the
reported DM-value of the interbank positions. In our estimations, we would therefore report a fall in the net
position of German banks. However, we consider the size of this bias likely to be smaller than the overall effect
we observe. Firstly, because it concerns less than 50% of the positions, and secondly because the magnitudes of
the actual responses would be unreasonably large if they were induced by exchange rate changes only: In figure
A3, e.g., a 5 basis point interest rate increase lowers the net foreign interbank positions by 0.8%. We would expect
the exchange rate effect to be much smaller. Under the assumption that small banks do not actively change their
positions abroad, a rough guess of this magnitude could be found by the response of this position, which is
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The results from this analysis are surprisingly clear, and furthermore robust to all
three ways of defining the interbank lending variables: the German system of intra-
sectoral linkages across banks tends to alleviate possible disadvantages of small
banks on the interbank market. By accessing the external interbank market through
their head institutions, which themselves belong to the group of large banks, small
banks may overcome size related market frictions. Whether this mechanism enables
them to completely overcome possible disadvantages nevertheless remains an open
question. But, if this were the case, small banks that are organised within one of the
two sectors would not face a disproportionately strong drain of liabilities following a
monetary contraction compared to larger banks. But, we can at least say that coop-
erative banks and savings banks should be more able to shelter their lending to non-
banks from interest rate shocks than are banks of similar size that do not belong to
one of the two sectors.
5.3 The maturity structure in the interbank market
The data collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank are disaggregated according to
the maturity structure of interbank lending. We had imposed the identification as-
sumption that a monetary policy shock constitutes a transitory phenomenon for all
included variables, an assumption that would be supported if the interbank lending
following such a shock were short term in nature. To test this hypothesis, we decom-
pose the interbank lending into short-term (up to three months) and long-term
lending (larger than three months), and repeat the analysis for both maturity catego-
ries. Figures A6 and A7 (see appendix) give the according results, confirming our
hypothesis: Long-term lending does not seem to play any role in the reaction to a
monetary policy shock; virtually all the reaction takes place in the short-term matu-
rities. This is interesting mainly with respect to the intra-sectoral results. It is well
known that, on average, the intra-sectoral positions are a device for maturity trans-
formations: “The savings banks and credit cooperatives lend mostly short-term funds to the
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primary institutions.”
22 Although this is certainly true in equilibrium, it is also the case
that the central institutions act as a provider of short-term funds in times of monetary
contractions (or, as will be shown in the next section, rather as an absorber of short-
term funds in times of monetary easing).
5.4 The reaction of internal interbank market positions
As has been seen in section 5.2, it is the internal interbank market that performs a
redistributive task following a monetary policy shock. The groups of small and me-
dium-sized banks borrow funds after a tightening, which are supplied by the group
of large banks. Since the analysis had only considered net positions so far, we are not
able to tell whether the groups of smaller banks withdraw funds they had deposited
with their head institutions, or whether they take up new loans. Figure A8 in the ap-
pendix provides the impulse response analysis of the gross positions on the internal
interbank market. The groups of small and medium-sized banks reduce their asset
holdings on the internal interbank market, which is reflected in a reduction of the
liabilities on the side of the group of large banks. Medium-sized banks furthermore
take up new loans; this reaction is quantitatively much less important than the re-
duction of assets, and as such not reflected in a significant response of the asset side
of the group of large banks.
It can therefore be concluded that the savings banks and credit cooperatives de-
posit short-term funds with their head institutions, when they have an ample supply
of such funds (like for example following a monetary easing) and that in times of
shortages, these funds can be withdrawn and flow back to the smaller banks.
Interestingly, the head institutions of the two sectors react to these outflows of
funds by adjusting their lending to non-banks accordingly. Following a monetary
tightening, they face an outflow of funds to the affiliated institutions, and conse-
quently reduce their loans to non-banks significantly. It turns out that the decrease of
bank lending to non-banks for the group of large banks (shown in figure A2) is
mostly borne by the head institutions: separating the response of the large banks into
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the head institutions and the other large banks, we find a significant negative re-
sponse of the head institutions, whereas that of the other large banks is only insig-
nificantly negative.
6 Loans from banks without intra-sectoral links
The preceding section has shown that the system of bank sectors can in principle
serve as a powerful tool for overcoming distributional effects of monetary policy
across banks of different size. Logically, the question arises, whether the results ob-
tained for the reaction of loans to non-banks in section 4 will change if only banks
without intra-sectoral links are considered. To investigate this, we have removed all
banks from our sample that report non-zero intra-sectoral positions. None of the re-
maining banks can access the internal interbank market of the savings banks or credit
cooperative sectors. We are left with only very few banks in the group of small and
medium-sized banks (in June 1995 only 91 out of 3665 banks), which are quantita-
tively negligible (in June 1995 their market share in bank lending amounts to only
0.7%). The response of their loans to non-banks to a monetary contraction is shown in
figure A9 (see appendix), and compared to the response of loans by the largest banks
(again, excluding all banks which are part of a sectoral system). Loans to non-banks
from smaller banks show no significant reaction instantaneously, but strongly de-
crease in the subsequent months. This reaction is much more pronounced than that
of the large banks, and additionally takes much longer to return to baseline.
23 This is
the size-related result usually obtained in empirical studies for other countries that
have a banking system without some sort of internal interbank market.
Due to the fact that both lending variables were included in the same model, it is
possible to apply simple t-tests on which reaction coefficient is stronger.
24 The fol-
lowing table presents the results:
                                                                
23 Using the narrow loan aggregate (loans to private firms and to self-employed only), we find a similar decrease
in the loans of small and medium-sized banks, and no significant response of the loans of large banks. The t-tests
show that the reaction of bank lending is much stronger for the smaller bank groups, also for this loan aggregate.
24 We are reporting the tests for single time periods rather than the whole impulse responses, since the calculation
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P e r i o d 0123456789
t-stat -1.34 0.71 1.99** 1.54* 1.37* 2.00** 1.68** 1.32** 1.23 1.08
** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level
We test a one-sided null hypothesis, namely that large banks react at least as
strongly with their lending to a monetary policy shock than does the group of small
and medium-sized banks ( sized medium small rge la H + ³q q : 0 , or, alternatively
0 : 0 ³ - + sized medium small rge la H q q ). Therefore, we can reject the null whenever the t-
statistic exceeds the critical value of 1.65 (5% significance level), or 1.28 (10% signifi-
cance level). The test results are rather clear: For periods 2 to 7, we can reject the null.
Only for the period in which the monetary policy shock occurs can the opposite hy-
pothesis be rejected. There is a clear support for a stronger reaction of loans from
small banks following a monetary policy contraction once all banks that belong to a
bank sector are removed from our sample. However, it has to be kept in mind that
this is only a very small fraction of all German banks and as such should not be of
major concern to policy makers.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has provided an empirical analysis of how interbank lending reacts to a
monetary policy contraction. Using the bank balance sheet database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, which covers all German banks, we have constructed size-sorted time
series to test hypotheses related to the bank lending channel theory. Several recent
contributions have argued that a meaningful test for the existence of such a bank
lending channel can be performed by analysing the reaction of bank loans following
a monetary policy shock: the loans of small banks, it is claimed, should fall by more
than those of relatively larger banks.
We have argued that, contrary to this reasoning, size in itself might not be a good
proxy to test for the bank lending channel in the German case. The majority of small
German banks is organised within either the savings banks’ sector or the credit coop-
erative sector. These sectors seem to access the interbank market as a whole, with the
large head institutions establishing the link between the external and the intra-ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 27
sectoral interbank market. The reaction of banks that are part of such a sector is
therefore not only dependent on the characteristics of the single bank, but also on the
position of the sector on the external interbank market.
It has been shown that, following a monetary contraction, funds are channelled
from the head institutions of the two sectors to their affiliated small banks. Large
banks on average access the international interbank market to dampen the liquidity
drain following a monetary contraction, and then funds are redistributed through the
internal interbank market of the two sectors to smaller banks via the head institu-
tions.
Small banks do not seem to play a major role on the external interbank market.
Their only source of additional funds is the internal interbank market. Neither the
domestic external market nor the international interbank market are accessed by the
group of small banks.
We have furthermore shown that applying a size measure to test for the existence
of a bank lending channel is much more appropriate in the German case once all the
banks that are organised in one of the two sectors are removed from the sample. In
this case, the size of a bank significantly affects the reaction of its loan volume to
monetary policy impulses: loans to non-banks from small banks decrease by more
than those from large banks do. However, it has to be noted that only very few small
banks are outside the banking sectors and as such subject to these distributional ef-
fects of monetary policy.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 28
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Appendix
A1: THE KPSW-APPROACH TO IDENTIFICATION IN STRUCTURAL VECTOR
AUTOREGRESSIONS
Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) go back to the seminal article by Sims
(1980). They assume that the economy can be described by a dynamic, stochastic,
linear model of the form:
t t t k t k t t X L A X A X A X A m m + = + + + = - - - 1 1 1 0 ) ( ... , with m m t iid N ~( , ) 0 S (A1)
where  t X  represents an nx1-vector of endogenous variables, including one or sev-
eral instrument variables, and L denotes the lag operator. The estimation proceeds
with the reduced form
XC X C X C L X tt k t k t t t =+ ++ = + -- - 11 1 ... ( ) e e , with CA A ii =
-
0
1  and em tt A =
-
0
1 .( A 2 )
Estimates can be found for the coefficient matrices  i C  and the variance-covariance
matrix of the disturbances e e t,S . However, of interest are the parameters in the ma-
trices  i A  and S m , which are exactly identified if n
2 parameters are restricted. A first
set of restrictions is found by the assumption of uncorrelated structural errors (i.e.
S m  diagonal) and by normalising the diagonal elements to unity, yielding
S m m m == EI tt n (’ ), which imposes nn () / +12  restrictions. Hence, further nn () / -12
restrictions are needed. Sims (1980) used a recursive structure to achieve identifica-
tion, whereas subsequent contributions extended the range of identification schemes
by restricting parameters in various matrices of the system. Amongst these are KPSW
(1991). They have shown that cointegration properties of the data can be used for
identification purposes. A cointegrated VAR model, which is in its Vector Error Cor-
rection format (Johansen 1995: 45-49):
DG D XX X tt i t i i
k
t =+ + -- =
- å ab e ’ 1 1
1
,( A 3 )
has the Granger representation
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where A depends on initial values,  0 ’ = A b , and C = ^^ ^
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. Equation (A4) shows that the representation in levels is composed ofECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 31
two parts, the non-stationary common trends ae ^ = å ’ i i
t
1  and the stationary part of
CL t *( )e .
The idea behind KPSW is to decompose the shocks  t e  into r  shocks that have only
transitory effects (on the levels of the variables), and  r n-  shocks with permanent
effects (with r  denoting the number of cointegration relations). This is achieved by















The matrix S  has to satisfy  0 ¹ SC . It follows that the new set of variables consists
of  r n-  non-stationary and r  stationary variables. The stationary variables are iden-
tical to the cointegrating vectors; their stationarity follows because  0 ’ = C b  and
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This system need not be identified fully; partial identification of either the transi-
tory or the persistent shocks is also possible. This amounts to the imposition of
) ( r n r -  identification restrictions by setting the according covariances of the shocks
to zero. These restrictions have been tested for by the test for the cointegrating rank.
Instead, however, a different kind of identification restriction is needed, namely a
decision in which part of the system the supposed shock is to be found (like in the
context of the present paper, where the monetary policy shock is identified in the
transitory subsystem). This restriction cannot be tested and has to be justified by eco-
nomic theory.
To identify the subsystems, additional untested identification restrictions are nec-
essary. If only the shocks with permanent effects are of interest, then
2 / ) 1 )( ( - - - r n r n  additional identification restrictions are needed. In particular,
where there are  1 - = n r  cointegration relations, no additional identification restric-
tions have to be imposed. Should the shocks of interest be the transitory ones, then
2 / ) 1 ( - r r  additional restrictions are sufficient.ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 32
A2: TEST STATISTICS
Table A1: L-max statistics for the test of cointegration rank
Total bank loans Bank loans small banks Bank loans large banks
a r 0 = 36.24 35.93 31.36
b r 1 = 17.90 29.60 18.33
c r 2 = 12.53 17.99 13.72
d r 3 = 5.49 10.77 6.65





Table A2: Test for 3 cointegrating vectors: Bundesbank reaction function, trend-
stationary real interest rates, bank lending cointegrates with interest
rates and trend
Total bank loans Bank loans small banks Bank loans large banks
) 3 (
2 c 7.66 5.95 2.91
p-val. 0.11 0.20 0.57
Table A3: L-max statistics for the test of cointegration rank,
(a) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
a r 0 = 38.74 43.01 39.28 39.45 39.02 39.28 37.97 42.09 42.09 35.50 34.08 37.52
b r 1 = 27.33 30.28 24.97 22.61 27.92 24.97 31.32 31.03 31.03 26.55 27.41 25.82
c r 2 = 23.84 20.86 20.46 17.44 20.6 20.46 25.18 20.16 20.16 16.61 19.76 18.78
d r 3 = 10.50 12.84 15.15 12.44 18.55 15.15 11.31 11.53 11.53 13.42 17.07 14.60
e r 4 = 8.03 6.13 7.68 7.05 8.70 7.68 8.18 7.86 7.86 6.46 5.13 6.74






(b) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
a r 0 = 42.11 44.48 41.64 43.31 43.49 42.07 39.87 49.93 49.93 39.72 39.07 40.15
b r 1 = 29.38 26.93 32.11 22.10 25.39 31.25 33.96 29.50 29.50 26.27 29.67 33.54
c r 2 = 24.74 22.45 22.84 17.74 20.34 22.47 25.34 21.11 21.11 18.48 17.70 19.87
d r 3 = 10.65 11.95 15.75 12.62 14.38 15.74 10.32 10.35 10.35 12.47 17.26 15.75
e r 4 = 7.20 6.77 9.92 8.51 8.72 9.80 6.88 9.38 9.38 8.10 6.17 9.64






(c) interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
a r 0 = 42.11 44.48 41.64 43.31 43.49 42.07 39.78 49.93 49.93 39.72 39.07 40.15
b r 1 = 29.38 26.93 32.11 22.10 25.39 31.25 33.96 29.50 29.50 26.27 29.67 33.54
c r 2 = 24.74 22.45 22.84 17.74 20.34 22.47 25.34 21.11 21.11 18.48 17.70 19.87
d r 3 = 10.65 11.95 15.75 12.62 14.38 15.74 10.32 10.35 10.35 12.47 17.26 15.75
e r 4 = 7.20 6.77 9.92 8.51 8.72 9.80 6.88 9.38 9.38 8.10 6.17 9.64
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Table  A4: Test for four cointegrating vectors: Bundesbank reaction function,
trend-stationary real interest rates, interbank lending variables coin-
tegrate with interest rates and trend
(a) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 c 3.67 3.10 2.21 4.27 2.40 2.21 4.34 1.51 1.51 2.09 1.43 3.03
p-val. 0.45 0.54 0.70 0.37 0.66 0.70 0.36 0.82 0.82 0.72 0.84 0.55
(b) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 c 4.92 4.60 1.79 4.09 3.43 1.69 5.08 2.02 2.02 2.25 1.89 2.31
p-val. 0.30 0.33 0.77 0.39 0.49 0.79 0.28 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.76 0.68
(c) interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 c 5.81 1.91 2.99 1.74 1.11 3.00 3.84 1.67 1.67 1.27 2.17 1.98
p-val. 0.21 0.75 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.56 0.43 0.80 0.80 0.87 0.70 0.74
Table A5: The maintained cointegrating vector concerning the interbank lend-
ing variable
(a) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
0.84 2.46 -0.60 0.21 1.12 0.82 0.71 1.12 -1.48 0.04 0.66 1.64
t r (0.06) (0.15) (0.35) (0.04) (0.05) (0.42) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.02) (0.05) (0.43)
-0.02 -0.02 -0.22 -0.01 0.01 -0.28 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.30 t
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
(b) interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
2.07 3.60 -0.29 0.31 1.20 0.26 1.76 1.26 -0.46 0.07 0.64 0.45
t r (0.15) (0.25) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08)
0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 t
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
(c) interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
1.13 2.02 -5.68 0.32 0.67 -4.05 0.65 1.28 -1.58 -0.02 -21.2 0.50
t r (0.08) (0.14) (0.43) (0.03) (0.04) (0.43) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.02) (3.78) (0.41)
0.01 -0.02 -0.38 0.00 -0.02 -0.43 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.68 -0.33 t
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.35) (0.04)ECB • Working Paper No 73 • July 2001 34
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Figure A2:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on bank loans to the non-
financial sector lending; bank variables calculated with methodol-
ogy (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interest Rate
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Figure A3:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending (by the
various bank size groups, from different segments of the interbank
market); interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interbank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Interest Rate
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Figure A4:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending (by the
various bank size groups, from different segments of the interbank
market); interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), de-
fined in ratios
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined in ratios
Interest Rate
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Figure A5:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending (by the
various bank size groups, from different segments of the interbank
market); interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interbank variables calculated with methodology (2)
Interest Rate
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Figure A6:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on long-term interbank lend-
ing (by the various bank size groups, from different segments of the
interbank market); interbank variables calculated with methodology
(1), defined in ratios
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
long-term interbank variables
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Figure  A7:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on short-term interbank
lending (by the various bank size groups, from different segments
of the interbank market); interbank variables calculated with meth-
odology (1), defined in ratios
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
short-term interbank variables
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Figure A8:  The  effects  of  a  monetary  policy  shock  on  the  internal  interbank
market; bank variables calculated with methodology (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
internal interbank market
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Figure A9:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on bank loans to the non-
financial sector by banks that are neither part of the savings bank
sector nor of the cooperative bank sector; bank variables calculated
with methodology (1)
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Interest Rate
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A4: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: INCLUSION OF A LINEAR TREND IN THE
REAL INTEREST RATE COINTEGRATING VECTOR
Table A6: Test for overidentifying restrictions of the four cointegrating vectors,
with and without a linear trend in the vector on real interest rates; in-
terbank variables calculated with methodology (1), defined as ratios
(a) real interest rates trend-stationary
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 c 4.92 4.60 1.79 4.09 3.43 1.69 5.08 2.02 2.02 2.25 1.89 2.31
p-val. 0.30 0.33 0.77 0.39 0.49 0.79 0.28 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.76 0.68
(b) real interest rates stationary
Interbank market External Internal Abroad
small med. large small med. large small med. large small med. large
) 4 (
2 c 7.83 12.37 7.61 11.62 11.59 7.74 7.77 8.40 8.40 11.23 10.18 7.95
p-val. 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.09
Figure A10:  The effects of a monetary policy shock on interbank lending, sensi-
tivity to the inclusion of a linear trend in the real interest rate coin-
tegrating vector
Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
sensitivity wrt trend stationarity of real interest rates
Interest Rate
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